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Resumo: Este artigo reinterpreta a Apologia de Sócrates 
de Platão como uma peça de oratória forense. Examinando os 
topoi retóricos utilizados por Platão, procuro demonstrar como 
Platão impulsiona os limites do gênero forense da oratória rumo 
à criação de uma nova prática discursiva: a filosofia.
Inicialmente, o artigo examina o conceito de “gênero” em 
conexão com a oratória forense. Esboçado a partir do trabalho de 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Tzvetan Todorov e Andrea Nightingale, o artigo 
estabelece uma consonância entre as concepções de “gênero” 
destes eruditos e aquilo que outros especialistas definiram como 
“gênero oratório forense”.
Em seguida, o artigo levanta a questão da razão de a 
Apologia de Platão tradicionalmente ter sido excluída deste 
gênero. Argumento que certas visões concernentes à presumida 
historicidade de discursos consignados à “oratória forense” 
precisam ser reexaminadas, já que não há evidência clara de 
que os atenienses requeressem acurácia histórica de discursos 
que ora classificamos como “oratória forense”. Ao remover a 
exigência de historicidade, obtemos um quadro mais preciso do 
que constitui a oratória forense e da razão de a Apologia de 
Platão merecer inclusão neste gênero.
Por conseguinte, o artigo examina detalhadamente vários 
topoi retóricos da Apologia. Argumento que, mediante a manipu-
lação e remodelação de tais topoi, Platão expande e redefine o 
gênero da oratória forense para incluir a nova prática discursiva 
da filosofia. O artigo revela como a redefinição platônica dos 
limites da oratória forense transformaram um discurso de defesa 
I. Introduction
Plato’s Apology of Socrates occupies an 
uneasy position in world literature.  While widely 
recognized as a canonical work in the history of 
Western philosophy, both the form and content of 
the Apology hardly conform to the conventional 
definition of a philosophical work:  the piece is in 
fact a criminal defense speech, delivered in a court 
of law, containing many rhetorical commonpla-
ces and hewing to the basic structure of forensic 
oratory.  And yet, as the successive centuries since 
its publication have borne witness, the Apology 
has so exceeded the traditional boundaries of the 
forensic genre that it is now viewed as a founding 
stone in the construction of philosophic thought.
This article seeks to show how Plato, in the 
Apology, utilized the genre of forensic oratory as a 
vehicle to create a living portrait of Socrates and, 
further, to push the boundaries of fourth century 
Attic oratory toward the creation of an entirely new 
manner of discourse – philosophy.  In doing this, 
Plato – whether intending to or not – employed 
forensic oratory both to draw from the rhetorical 
devices of the logographers and simultaneously to 
alter such topoi to expand the existing methods 
of fourth century discourse to include the new 
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criminal em tribunal jurídico na condição sine qua non do 
filósofo e da vida filosófica.
Palavras-chave: oratória forense; Platão; Apologia de 
Sócrates; gênero
Abstract: This article recasts Plato’s Apology of Socrates 
as a piece of forensic oratory.  By examining the rhetorical 
topoi utilized by Plato, I intend to demonstrate how Plato 
pushes the boundaries of the genre of forensic oratory to-
ward the creation of a new discursive practice:  philosophy. 
The article first examines the concept of “genre” in 
connection with forensic oratory.  Drawing upon the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Tzvetan Todorov, and Andrea Nightingale, 
the article establishes a consonance between these scholars’ 
conceptions of genre and what other scholars have defined 
as the “genre” of forensic oratory.
The article then takes up the question of why Plato’s 
Apology traditionally has been excluded from this genre. I 
argue that certain views concerning the presumed historicity 
of speeches awarded the label of “forensic oratory” need 
to be reexamined, as there is no clear evidence that the 
Athenians required historical accuracy of the speeches we 
now classify as forensic oratory.  By removing the requi-
rement of historicity, we gain a more accurate picture of 
what constitutes forensic oratory and why Plato’s Apology 
deserves membership in this genre. 
The article then examines in detail various rhetorical 
topoi in the Apology.  I argue that by manipulating and 
reworking such topoi, Plato expands and redefines the genre 
of forensic oratory to include the new discursive practice of 
philosophy.  The article reveals how Plato’s redefinition of 
the boundaries of forensic oratory transformed a criminal 
defendant’s speech in a court of law into the sine qua non 
of the philosopher and the philosophic life.
Keywords:  forensic oratory; Plato; Apology of Socra-
tes; genre.
discursive practice of philosophy.  With this achie-
vement, Plato’s rhetorical triumph far surpassed 
anything even remotely imagined by his rivals: 
utilizing forensic oratory as his literary vehicle, 
Plato succeeded ultimately in justifying Socrates’ 
seemingly strange way of life not only to Athenian 
society but to future generations – whose very 
conception of philosophy originates in Plato’s 
portrait of his master.  A criminal defendant’s speech 
to a jury in a court of law became the sine qua non 
of the philosopher and the philosophic life.
II. The “Genre” of Attic Forensic 
Oratory
A first order of business is to clarify what I 
mean by “genre,” then explain how that term applies 
to fourth century Attic oratory, and, lastly, detail 
how Plato’s Apology has traditionally been excluded 
from that genre, before moving on to recast the 
Apology as in fact belonging to – at least initially 
– such genre.
In defining genre, I look primarily to An-
drea Nightingale’s ground-breaking work on the 
subject, particularly with regard to the writings of 
Plato, along with Nightingale’s citation of Mikhail 
Bakhtin and others, especially Tzvetan Todorov. 
(NIGHTINGALE, 1995, p. 3).  Todorov starts with 
Bakhtin’s initial formulation of the conception 
of genre and offers the following theory:  “In a 
given society, the recurrence of certain discursive 
properties is institutionalized, and individual texts 
are produced and perceived in relation to the norm 
constituted by the codification.  Any genre, whether 
literary or not, is nothing other than a codification 
of discursive properties.” (TODOROV, 1978/1990, pp. 
17-18, quoted in NIGHTINGALE, 1995, p. 3, n. 6).
Despite this “codification,” genres are not 
static.  As Gary Morson and Caryl Emerson explain 
in elaborating Bakhtin’s theory of genre, “[e]ach 
author who contributes to the genre learns to 
experience the world in the genre’s way, and if the 
work is significant and original, to enrich the genre’s 
capacity for future visualization. . . .  Genres are 
neither lifeless collections of formal features nor 
abstract combinations of philosophical premises...” 
(MORSON; EMERSON, 1990, pp. 282-3). To put it 
succinctly, genres – in Bakhtin’s view – “are really 
forms of thinking.” (MORSON; EMERSON, 1990, p. 
280).
1
  With this conception of genre in mind, we can 
better understand what it is to speak of a “genre” 
of forensic oratory.
2
We know that the corpus of Attic forensic 
oratory consists of more than a hundred surviving 
speeches, dating approximately from 430 to 320, 
1. See also (NIGHTINGALE, 1995, 
p. 3):  “[G]enres are not merely 
artistic forms but forms of thought 
. . . .” (emphasis in original).
2. To speak of a “genre” of 
forensic oratory is not without 
controversy.  See discussion 
infra, p.6.
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that appear to have been written for delivery in 
the law courts or Assembly. (GAGARIN, 1997, p. 1). 
Further, insofar as the rule was that a litigant had 
to argue his own case, logographers wrote many of 
the speeches.  In the third century, scholars began 
to study and collect these speeches and went so far 
as to establish a “canon” of ten orators, producing 
“grammatical and lexicographic notes” about the 
corpus of speeches. (GAGARIN, 1997, p. 1).
From this “canon,” thus, one can make cer-
tain observations about similarities in prose style, 
rhetorical commonplaces, and other topoi which, 
taken together, can be seen to comprise a genre 
in the sense contemplated by Bakhtin and Todorov. 
Indeed, even a cursory reading of several of the 
speeches together reveals, to use Todorov’s phrase, 
“the recurrence of certain discursive properties.”
Further, a general structure of the forensic 
speech becomes evident:  prologue (προοίμιον), 
narrative (διήγησις), argument or proof (πίστις), 
and epilogue (ἐπίλογος).
3
  And, of course, there 
are the early rhetorical handbooks such as Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and Anaximenes’ Manual of Rhetoric 
that sought to define the rules and standards to 
which all forms of oratory need conform. Thus, a 
scholarly discipline developed,focusing on the study 
of ancient rhetoric as a genre.  Such studies have of 
course evolved considerably, ranging, for example 
from the nineteenth century’s “preoccupation,” in 
the words of Edwin Carawan, with formal features
4
 
to the modern appreciation of rhetoric as having 
both shaped and having in turn been shaped by 
Athenian culture, with its societal norms and 
realities.  As Carawan makes clear, “Much depends 
upon the speechmaker’s skill in constructing an 
‘imagined community,’ articulating the shared 
morals and motivations that bound the citizen body 
together.” (CARAWAN, 2007, p. xii.)  This sounds 
remarkably consonant both with Todorov’s claim that 
in any given genre “individual texts are produced and 
perceived in relation to the norm constituted by the 
codification” and with Bakhtin’s theory that authors 
learn “to experience the world in the genre’s way,” 
and if they have sufficient imagination, “to enrich 
the genre’s capacity for future visualization . . .”
 
III. The Traditional Exclusion of 
Plato’s Apology from Forensic Oratory
With the Apology, the question immediately 
arises as to what precisely one is reading:  a Platonic 
dialogue?  A defense speech?  Both?  Moreover, since 
we have enough accounts and historical evidence 
of the trial and execution of Socrates that we can 
reasonably conclude that such an event happened – 
a conclusion, it should be emphasized, that cannot 
be made with respect to the majority of forensic 
oratory
5
 – may we then regard the Apology as an 
historical document?
Sifting through and expounding upon the vast 
body of divergent views on the historical accuracy 
of the Apology is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the sheer volume of effort expended in 
attempting to deduce whether Plato’s work consti-
tutes a more-or-less faithful representation of what 
Socrates in fact said during his trial or, conversely, 
reflects Plato’s own philosophic views and literary 
virtuosity, illustrates just how difficult it is to place 
the Apology in any particular genre, including that 
of forensic oratory.  Indeed, the debate over the 
historicity of Plato’s Apology subsumes the few 
clear attempts that have been made to describe 
the work as belonging to any certain genre.  For 
example, E. de Stryker maintains that for many scho-
lars, “the interpretation of the Apology is ancillary 
to the reconstruction of the historical Socrates.” 
(DE STRYKER; SLINGS, 1994, p. 1).
6
  And for those 
who regard the Apology primarily as fiction, the 
question of genre becomes almost irrelevant.  Donald 
Morrison, in challenging the historical reliability of 
the Apology, questions “whether and to what extent 
the notion of ‘genre’ can validly be applied to the 
literary productions of classical Greece.” (MORRISON, 
2000, p. 235).
7
What remains indisputable is that historically 
Plato’s Apology has not been included in the canon 
of Attic oratory.  Plato’s name certainly does not 
fall within the list of ten orators compiled in the 
third century, nor has the Apology traditionally 
been viewed as a work of oratory, owing not least 
to Plato’s fame for inveighing consistently against 
the very practice of oratory.
3. See (GAGARIN, 1997, p. 18): 
“The traditional four-part division 
of a speech . . . was said to 
have been devised by Tisias a 
generation earlier [than] Antiphon 
. . .”
4. Carawan describes as examples 
of such nineteenth-century 
“preoccupation with formal 
features” Blass’s Beredsamkeit, 
Jebb’s Orators, and Navarre’s Essai. 
(CARAWAN, 2007, p. xi.)
  
5. See argument infra, pp. 8-9.
6. For examples of commentators 
who lean toward the “historicist” 
side of the spectrum, see (BURNET, 
1924),(GUTHRIE, 1971), (VLASTOS, 
1971), and (BRICKHOUSE; SMITH, 
1989).
7. For examples of commentators 
who view the Apology primarily as 
Plato’s own literary creation, see 
(CROUST, 1957), (STOKES, 1992), 
(MORRISON, 2000), and (PRIOR, 
2001). 
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Interestingly, one scholar’s attempt to place 
the Apology within the framework of forensic oratory 
has met stiff resistance.  Charles Kahn argues that 
the Apology “belongs to a traditional genre, the 
courtroom speech revised for publication . . .” while 
Plato’s other “dialogues all belong to the new genre 
of ‘Conversations with Socrates.’” (KAHN, 1996, 
p. 88). W.J. Prior disagrees profoundly, claiming 
that “the Apology is in fact a dialogue between 
Socrates and the jury, and by extension, the people 
of Athens.” (PRIOR, 2001, p. 48, n. 16).  So too, 
Morrison retorts that Kahn is mistaken in placing 
Plato’s Apology in “the genre of courtroom speeches 
revised for publication.”  Morrison’s position is worth 
quoting in full:
[T]his traditional genre is one in which the author 
writes a speech which he either delivers himself, or gives 
to another to deliver, before a court, and then revises 
later for publication.  Unless one believes that Plato 
actually ghostwrote Socrates’ speech for him — which so 
far as I am aware no scholar has claimed — then Plato’s 
defense speech is of a different type.  The gap between 
a speech that is actually delivered in a courtroom, and 
the revised version which a proud and creative author 
might eventually publish, can of course be great.  The 
published version may contain arguments and appeals 
which the author did not include at the time, but later 
comes to think he should have.  But there is a natural 
and organic relation between the original speech and 
the published version in such a case, which there is not 
between a literary version written by one person of a 
speech which was originally composed and delivered by 
someone else. (MORRISON, 2000, p. 240).
It is fair to say that Morrison’s refusal 
to apply the term “courtroom speech” to the 
Apology – insofar as that term is synonymous 
with forensic oratory – represents the majority 
view.  But such a view necessarily makes three 
assumptions:  (1) that “courtroom speeches” were 
written by a single “author”; (2) that the “author” 
either delivered the speech himself or gave it to 
another to deliver in court; and (3) that Plato’s 
Apology of Socrates fails to meet the criteria of 
the second assumption.  
It is my contention that none of these as-
sumptions may be presumed and, further, that at a 
certain point they become almost irrelevant to the 
task of better understanding the fourth century 
discursive practice of forensic oratory and the place 
that Plato’s Apology holds within the evolution of 
that practice.  Limiting the definition of the genre 
of forensic oratory to the first two assumptions is an 
impoverished approach to reading and interpreting 
the texts we possess. In addition, such method 
relies on “facts not in evidence,” to use a modern 
legal turn of phrase.  Put differently, both the avai-
lable historical evidence and the textual evidence 
contained in the “courtroom speeches” themselves 
may not support the assumptions underlying a 
definition of forensic oratory restricted to a genre 
that excludes Plato’s Apology.
Just as the scope of this paper cannot possibly 
encompass a thorough review of the evidence on 
the historical reliability of the Apology, so too an 
exhaustive analysis of the authenticity of the extant 
forensic orations is beyond reach.  Nonetheless, a 
few points about authorship and delivery in court 
can be made.
As early as the start of the last century, 
theorists have argued that forensic orations are not 
authentic courtroom speeches.  A.C. Darkow posited 
(1917, p. 4) that the “speeches were written as 
literature, or at least as “rhetorische Musterstücke” 
[rhetorical exercises].”  In more recent years, K.J. 
Dover’s  work, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, 
suggests “composite authorship,” thereby calling 
into question the authority of Lysias’ speeches 
to such a degree that Steven Usher, in a widely 
respected response to Dover, worries that Dover’s 
thesis “casts doubt upon the authenticity of all 
Attic oratory . . . .” (USHER, 1976, p. 36).  Carawan 
(2007, p. xiii) acknowledges that “Usher’s answer 
to Dover . . . has convinced many of us, but, it 
is fair to say, Dover’s thesis remains viable and 
instructive.”  Moreover, John Porter (1997, p. 82) 
makes a compelling case that Lysias 1, On the Murder 
of Eratosthenes, is quite probably a “fictional speech 
based on a fictional case, designed not only to ins-
truct and to delight but, quite probably to advertise 
the logographer’s skill.”
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Here, Porter’s observation that Lysias’ use of 
stock characters and events seemingly taken straight 
from the “conventions of comic adultery narratives” 
(PORTER, 1997, p. 82) brings us back full circle 
to the Apology.  The majority of those who refuse 
to place the Apology within the genre of forensic 
oratory do so largely on the ground that there exists 
a separate genre of Socratic apologies, with its 
own set of literary conventions, which belonged to 
the larger genre of “Socratic literature.”
8
  Morrison 
(2000, p. 239), for example takes this position, 
claiming that “there was a ‘genre’ of defenses and 
accusations of Socrates in antiquity, and we have 
one other example, Xenophon’s Apology of Socrates.” 
After conceding that Plato’s piece is a direct speech 
unlike Xenophon’s Apology, Morrison argues that 
“we do not have good grounds for thinking that 
fourth-century Athenian authors and readers would 
have regarded Socratic ‘apologies’ as belonging to 
a genre distinct from Socratic ‘dialogues.’”
But Porter’s study of Lysias 1 demonstrates 
just how arbitrary and artificial genre boundaries can 
be.  Drawing upon Dover’s argument that Athenian 
audiences were “habituated” to a “dramatization of 
events” in published forensic speeches that never 
purported to be a “verbatim record” but rather 
“represented an artistically sophisticated version 
of what could or should have been said in court,” 
Porter (1997, p. 73) asks the following question:  to 
what degree might “this habituation [have] permit-
ted or even encouraged the stylization of forensic 
narratives to incorporate character-types and pat-
terns of action familiar from various literary genres”?
Seen from this perspective, Plato’s Apology su-
ddenly seems not dissimilar to Lysias’s On the Murder 
of Eratoshenes.  Indeed, with respect to the former, 
there is certainly plentiful evidence that an actual 
trial of someone named Socrates took place.  And 
yet by conventional standards, Lysias 1 is “forensic 
oratory” but Plato’s Apology is not.  Something is 
clearly amiss with our demarcation of genres when 
a work that may very well be “an elaborate fiction” 
based on the “typical comic adultery tale,” (PORTER, 
1997, p. 88) assumes the status of a genuine forensic 
oration while another author’s published version of 
a defense speech in a trial we can be reasonably 
certain occurred, is regarded largely as the product 
of literary license.
9
Indeed, the demarcation appears to rest upon 
the assumed historicity of those speeches awarded 
the “forensic oratory” label.  But it is by no me-
ans evident that the Athenians required historical 
accuracy of the speeches we now think of as forensic 
oratory.  On the contrary, Gorgias’ Apology of Pala-
medes, a work of pure fiction – with its defense of 
a mythological character – so approximates a “real” 
defense speech that its structure and essential 
line of argument became, in the words of Kenneth 
Seeskin (1982, p. 95), “so widespread that it is pos-
sible to view it as a paradigm of sophistical oratory,” 
a veritable “set speech which students were asked to 
memorize and imitate.”  Other examples of fictional 
pieces that read like forensic orations are the Ajax 
and Odysseus of Antisthenes and the Odysseus of 
Pseudo-Alcidamas. (PORTER, 1997, p. 82).
In addition, it is likely that even with respect 
to those speeches that, to a reasonable certainty, 
concerned actual court cases, such texts were either 
altered by their respective authors after delivery and 
before publication or even published without ever 
having been delivered in court, with no complaint 
by the Athenian public on historical pedigree.  de 
Stryker points out as an example Desmosthenes’ In 
Midiam – a text which the orator first wrote and 
then, after accepting a settlement out of court, later 
published, “having larded it with new material.  The 
public asked no questions, as it was interested in the 
lively arguments, not in painstaking conformity with 
what had actually been said at the time by either 
party.” (DE STRYKER; SLINGS, 1994, p. 3).
The question of historical truth, as concerns 
both the forensic orations and Plato’s Apology, is one 
I must ultimately leave to others.  My aim, rather, 
is to show that any close reading of the Apology as 
text cannot ignore the striking similarities between 
that work and the body of literature we have come 
to denominate forensic oratory – regardless of the 
validity of the reasons for the denomination.  There 
is simply no good reason for wholesale exclusion of 
Plato’s Apology from forensic oratory.  By including 
the work in the ranks of courtroom speeches, we 
are able to discern Plato’s remarkable capacity to 
8. See, e.g., (BRICKHOUSE; SMITH, 
1989, p. 5): “The ‘fiction theory’ 
holds that the ‘Socratic literature’ 
sparked by the trial attempted 
no accurate representation of 
Socrates words or opinions . . . 
[but] use[d] the moment of the 
trial only as a way of enhancing 
their characters’ words . . . .”
9. Porter even draws a direct 
parallel between Lysias 1 and the 
“various Apologies of Socrates 
(one attributed to Lysias himself), 
all of which are cloaked in the 
guise of historical orations.”  Id., 
83. (emphasis mine).
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“enrich” the genre – “enrich” in the sense contem-
plated by Bakhtin – at the same time Plato begins to 
establish the new discursive practice of philosophy, 
as envisioned by Nightingale.
IV. The Prooimion of Plato’s Apology 
of Socrates
From the very first line of what Morrison, Prior 
and others claim to be a “dialogue,” Plato affords 
the reader the unmistakable impression that the 
text is in fact a defense speech:  “What you may 
have experienced, oh Athenian men, because of my 
accusers, I do not know . . . so convincingly did they 
speak.  Yet not a word of what they have said is true 
(ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα . . . οὕτω 
πιθανῶς ἔλεγον.  καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος 
εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν, 17a1-4).”10 
The speaker, Socrates, makes use of a 
formal address to the jurors – literally, “oh Athe-
nian men (ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι)” – perhaps the 
most commonplace of forensic rhetorical devices. 
Indeed, in Lysias 1, the speaker Euphiletos uses 
a formal epithet, ὦ ἄνδρες (“oh men”), in 
addition to the perfect tense of the verb πάσκω 
(“experience”), a combination which Plato also 
employs, apparent in his use of πεπόνθατε 
(“you all have experienced”).  Here is 
Euphiletos’ opening line:  “I would consider it to 
be of great importance, oh men, that you should 
be such jurors to me concerning this matter, the 
very sort you would be to yourselves if you had 
experienced the same things (Περὶ πολλοῦ ἂν 
ποιησαίμην, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ τοιούτους ὑμᾶς 
ἐμοὶ δικαστὰς περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος 
γενέσθαι, οἷοίπερ ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς εἴητε 
τοιαῦτα πεπονθότες, 1.1-3).”  
Thus, we see a commonality between Lysias 
and Plato:  a formal address coupled with a shared 
experience.  Socrates forges a link with the jurors 
by referencing a jointly-lived moment – hearing 
the accusers speak “persuasively” against Socrates. 
Similarly, Euphiletos calls upon the jurors to imagine 
themselves having endured his own misfortunes 
before judging him.
Yet Plato, using the character of Socrates, 
pushes the boundaries of the genre even further, 
to accomplish something truly radical:  in the very 
first line of a courtroom speech, the speaker claims 
ignorance:  “I don’t know (οὐκ οἶδα).”  Despite 
frequent disclaimers in the proioimia to any special 
skill at speaking, conventional orators sought at 
all costs to avoid the perception of ignorance.  As 
Michael Stokes (1997, p. 99) explains, the orators 
wanted “to give an initial impression of an assured 
grasp, not (however inexperienced they claim[ed] 
to be) of hesitant ignorance.”  We, of course, can 
recognize through hindsight the brilliance of Plato’s 
move:  Socrates presents in his opening a theme 
absolutely crucial to Socratic philosophy – ignorance, 
not knowing.  Henceforth, admission of ignorance 
will become the hallmark of true wisdom.  But our 
modern recognition of Plato’s sleight-of-hand achie-
vement should not blind us to the magnitude and 
daring in his own time of this new approach.  As 
Nightingale (1995, p. 11) explains, “[B]ecause his-
tory has conferred upon the discipline of philosophy 
the legitimacy and high status that Plato claimed for 
it, we moderns tend to overlook the effort it took 
to bring this about.”  Indeed, the irony of Plato’s 
attempt to establish ignorance (as a founding stone 
to philosophy) within the framework of a genre itself 
contemptuous of ignorance is matched only by the 
fact that his lead character’s claim not to know 
(οὐκ οἶδα) will make Socrates a household word 
for generations to come.
Similarly, Socrates’ use of “oh Athenian men” 
(ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι) – in contrast to the usual 
and more respectful  “oh men [who are] jurors” (ὦ 
ἄνδρες δικασταί) – in his opening address to the 
jury is virtually unheard of in Attic oratory.
11
  Plato 
reserves Socrates’ use of “oh men [who are] jurors” 
until the very end of the Apology, when Socrates 
addresses only those jurors who voted to acquit 
him, claiming that, by “calling you jurors I rightly 
name you (ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς 
ἂν καλοίην, 40a2).”
12
  In this way, Plato sets up a 
contrast between the descriptive title, “Athenian men,” 
in Socrates’ opening address to the jury and Socrates’ 
normative application of the title “men [who are] 
jurors” only to those men who voted to acquit him.
13
 
10. All translations are mine 
unless otherwise noted.
11. Stokes points out that even 
“oh Athenians” as an opening 
address “is absent from the extant 
Andocides, Antiphon and Isaeus, 
occurs only twice in Lysias, and 
is relatively unusual even in 
Demosthenes.” (STOKES, 1997, 
p. 98).
12. Id., 98:  “Postponement of 
‘gentlemen’ judges until fairly late 
in a speech is rare.”
13.  Having signaled this 
distinction, I am mindful of 
Stokes’s twofold warning that 
“scribal confusion of these 
formulae does occur” and 
that “ancient scholarship may 
havetidied the orators’ practice.” 
Id., 98.  Nonetheless, when taken 
together with the staggering 
amount of Plato’s appropriation 
and incorporation of other forensic 
commonplaces, the conclusion is 
difficult to resist.
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The reason behind Socrates’ act of redefi-
ning – re-“naming,” in essence (καλοίην) – the 
appellation of juror (δικαστής) is explained in the 
prooimion.  Socrates proffers what he believes is a 
juror’s sole ἀρετή:  to decide whether a litigant’s 
case is just.  Thus, Socrates beseeches the jurors 
during the prooimion to excuse the manner and style 
with which he speaks and to judge him based solely 
upon whether what he says is just, for such action 
on their part constitutes justice itself:
[a]nd in particular now I need this of you, which is 
just, as it seems to me, to disregard my manner of spe-
aking – perhaps it might be better, perhaps worse – but 
to examine and pay attention to this alone, whether what 
I say is just or not.  For that is the virtue of a juror . . . .
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, 
ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως 
ἐᾶν – ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν 
εἴη – αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν 
προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν 
γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μἠ.  δικαστοῦ 
μὲν γὰρ αὔτη ἀρετή . . . .(18a1-5).
Henceforth, justice is to be the sole criterion 
by which a juror is to perform his duty – not, as 
Socrates will argue toward the close of his speech 
“to grant favors . . . but to render justice according 
to the laws (οὐ χαρεῖσθαι . . . ἀλλὰ δικάσειν 
κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, 35c4-5).”  Moreover, the 
divorce of justice from the orator’s presentation 
– the “manner of speech (τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς 
λέξεως)” – without regard to whether it “might 
be better or worse (ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως 
δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη)” for the litigant, connects 
directly with what Plato accomplishes in reworking 
several other, standard forensic topoi: (1) a litigant’s 
customary expression of disbelief and astonishment 
(θαυμάζω) at his opponent’s position, (2) the 
usual disclaimer of rhetorical ability, and (3) the 
oft-repeated promise to tell the jurors the truth. 
The following lines are worth examining at length:
But of the many lies they[, my accusers,] made, I 
was most amazed when they said that it was necessary 
for you to be on your guard so as not to be deceived 
by me as I am a clever speaker. . . .  [T]his seemed to 
be the most shameful thing on their part, unless what 
they call clever speaking is telling the truth.  If they 
mean this, I would agree that I am a rhetor, but not in 
the way that they are.  Whereas these men, as I say, 
have said little or nothing truthful, from me you will 
hear the entire truth.
μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν 
ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν 
ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε 
ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. . . .  τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν 
αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν 
καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ 
μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε 
οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.  οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, 
ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, 
ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 
(17a4-b8).
The expression of amazement (ἐθαύμασα) 
at just how low an opposing litigant has stooped 
– or more accurately, is portrayed by the speaker 
as having stooped – is a hallmark of forensic proo-
imoia, dating back to the earliest legal narrative in 
Greek literature, the Homeric Hymn to Hermes.
14
  So 
too is the disclaimer of rhetorical skill; as Stokes 
(1997, p. 100) points out, such a disclaimer “is 
itself a rhetorical convention.”  But nowhere in all 
of Attic oratory is the attempt made, as Plato does, 
to redefine – and rehabilitate – oratorical virtuosity 
by claiming that it is nothing more than telling the 
truth.
15
  Speaking truthfully (τὸν τἀληθῆ 
λέγοντα) is, or should be, the sole criterion for 
judging how accomplished a rhetor is.
To be sure, Plato does not have Socrates claim 
that he speaks the truth whereas other orators do 
not.  Rather, Socrates’ vow to speak “the entire truth 
(πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν)” expands exponentially 
the scope of the promise:  no longer can the account 
presented to the jurors concern only those events 
which the litigant experienced and which favor 
the litigant’s case.  The contrast between Socrates’ 
unconditioned vow to speak the truth and the hi-
ghly conditioned version of the same delivered by 
Euphiletos in Lysias 1 is striking.  Here is Euphile-
14. See Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 
219-20.
15. See Stokes, 1997, p. 101: 
“Eloquence and truth were not 
always incompatible, but I have 
found no passage in the orators 
defining a clever speaker as one 
who tells the truth.” (emphasis 
in original).
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tos:  “Accordingly, I will demonstrate to you from 
the beginning the entirety of my affairs, omitting 
nothing, but speaking the truth; for I believe that 
this is my only salvation, if I am able to speak to 
you of all the things that happened (ἐγὼ τοίνυν 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ἐπιδείξω τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ 
πράγματα, οὐδὲν παραλείπων, ἀλλὰ λέγων 
τἀληθῆ· ταύτην γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ μόνην ἡγοῦμαι 
σωτηρίαν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν ἅπαντα δυνηθῶ 
τὰ πεπραγμένα, 5.1-4).”  Whereas Euphiletos’ 
truth-telling is linked directly with his affairs (τὰ 
ἐμαυτοῦ πράγματα) and the events that have 
transpired (τὰ πεπραγμένα), particularly as 
concerns his own salvation (σωτηρίαν), Socrates’ 
vow is wholly unfettered.  Plato, thus, has seemingly 
raised the bar for the orators:  when they promise 
to tell the truth, more is at stake than the events 
in question and personal fate.
“Speaking the whole truth” – a now familiar 
standard by which modern-day witnesses swear 
before testifying in court – is the foundation of 
Socrates’ decision to embark on his famous quest 
to investigate the Delphic oracle’s declaration that 
no one was wiser than Socrates, a quest that he 
sets as the model for the philosophic life and the 
greatest good for humankind (μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν 
ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, 38a2-3).  As Socrates makes 
clear in his diēgēsis:  “Clearly he [the god at Delphi] 
is not lying; for that would not be right of him (οὐ 
γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ, 
21b6-7).  Accordingly, a rhetor’s standard promise 
to tell the truth to the jury now rises so as to be 
coequal with what is “right” or “just” in the true 
sense of the word, θέμις – in accordance with the 
law as laid down and established by custom, not 
fixed by statute.  And this, in turn, may well require 
abandoning the normal conventions of Athenian 
society and living life in a wholly new fashion.  As 
Nightingale (1995, p. 10) explains, “‘philosophy’ as 
Plato conceived it comprised not just an analytic 
inquiry into certain types of subjects but a unique 
set of ethical and metaphysical commitments that 
demanded a whole new way of living.”
In other words, Plato has Socrates conjure an 
atmosphere for the jurors where speaking the truth 
becomes the “greatest good (μέγιστον ἀγαθόν).” 
But the genius of Plato lies most in the fact that in 
so conjuring, Plato recasts the genre in which this 
idea is presented to the jury – forensic oratory – to 
itself be synonymous with telling the “entire truth.” 
Substance and form unite so as to “enrich” the 
genre in the sense contemplated by Bakhtin and to 
equip it as the vehicle for relaying to the Athenian 
community the new discursive practice of philoso-
phy.    
Thus, in less than one Stephanus page, Plato’s 
prooimion for Socrates has already opened up a new 
“form of thinking” – to borrow Bakhtin’s shorthand 
definition of genre – by use of several standard 
rhetorical devices that one can locate easily in any 
number of forensic orations.  de Stryker (1994, p. 
180) is correct in asserting that by utilizing topoi 
common to contemporary forensic oratory, “Plato 
gave the Apology from the very outset the outward 
appearance of a law-court speech, but he wanted 
the reader (or rather hearer) to be continually 
surprised and puzzled by ideas and intentions that 
did not seem to conform to the literary form chosen 
by him.” In this way, I would argue, philosophy, as 
we have come to know it, was born.
16
V. Socrates’ Narrative (Diegesis)
Plato continues his vindication of Socrates 
via the medium of a forensic oration in Socrates’ 
diegesis, the narration to the jury of the events of 
his case.  As was the custom with forensic narratives, 
the character of the litigant assumes paramount 
importance.
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle advised that:
The narration ought to be indicative of character. This 
will be so if we know what makes for character.  One way, 
certainly, is to make deliberate choice [proairesis] clear: 
what the character is on the basis of what sort of choice 
[has been made].  And choice is what it is because of 
the end aimed at. (iii,1417a16-19).
17
Given such advice, it is not surprising that the 
narratives of forensic oratory are replete with vivid 
portraits of their speakers, deliberately crafted to 
sway the jurors to identify and sympathize with the 
16. See, e.g., (NIGHTINGALE, 
1995, pp. 10-11):  “In order to 
create the specialized discipline 
of philosophy, Plato had to 
distinguish what he was doing 
from all other discursive practices 
that laid claim to wisdom. . . This 
was a bold and difficult enterprise 
whose success was by no means 
guaranteed . . . .”
17. Trans. Kennedy.
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character of the speaker.  Lysias was deemed to be a 
virtually unrivalled master of this craft.  For example, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus praised Lysias’ skill in 
making each litigant portray himself as “trustworthy 
and honest.”
18
  As de Stryker (1994, p. 71) argues,
What ancient literary critics found so remarkable 
in such speeches as Lysias’ On the Invalid and On the 
Murder of Eratosthenes was his ability to present litigants 
speaking in bold frankness and apparent naïveté about 
their intentions and their acts, even if these were in 
some respects blameworthy, because this would gain the 
spontaneous sympathy of the audience who recognized 
them as people like themselves.
The narrative that Plato gives to Socrates finds 
its counterpart in the narratives of other forensic 
orations in that the character of “Socrates” who 
emerges becomes far more compelling than the 
formal legal arguments offered in support of his 
case.  For instance, Lysias 1 offers less a precise legal 
argument as to why the speaker should be acquitted 
than a memorable and amusing portrait of a man 
one part naïve with respect to his wife’s adulterous 
behavior and two parts headstrong and idealistic 
concerning domestic affairs and the laws of the city. 
As Porter (1997, p. 61) explains, Lysias has created 
so “forthright” a character in Euphiletos that “we 
are made to feel [he] could never have devised the 
calculating schemes of which [he] has been accused 
by the prosecution.”  This air of “levity” that Lysias 
injects into the narrative both lessens “the gravity of 
the husband’s deed” and serves to “evoke from the 
jury a sympathetic understanding of the outraged 
husband’s response.”
Something similar is at work in Plato’s 
narrative on behalf of Socrates, who beco-
mes the equivalent of a literary character.  For 
example, there is certainly a touch of humor in 
Socrates’ ostensible naïveté at his becoming more 
and more hated (ἀπηχθόμην) as he journeys to 
the politicians, poets and craftsmen demonstrating 
that those of them who seem wise are in fact not: 
“And then I was attempting to show him that while 
he might think himself to be wise, he was in fact 
not.  As a result of this I became hateful to him and 
to the many others present. (κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην 
αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, 
εἴη δ’ οὔ.  ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην 
καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, 21c7-d1).”  Much 
as with Euphiletos’ failure to recognize the clear 
signs of his wife’s adultery, one is hard-pressed not 
to ask Socrates, “Did you really expect otherwise?”
And yet, the reader/listener takes away from 
the narratives memorable impressions of characters 
whose “forthrightness” attains – or at least seeks to 
attain – a higher level of moral rectitude.  And so, 
Euphiletos attributes his murder of Eratosthenes to 
a civic command.  He contends that as he slew his 
wife’s lover, he proclaimed “It is not I who will slay 
you but the law of the city (οὐκ ἐγώ σε ἀποκτενῶ, 
ἀλλ’ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος, 26.2)” and reasons to 
the jury, “[a]ccordingly, for me, oh men, the laws 
not only have acquitted me from having done any 
wrong, but moreover have ordered [me] to exact 
the judgment (ἐμοῦ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ μὲν 
νόμοι οὐ μόνον ἀπεγνωκότες εἰσὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ κεκελευκότες ταύτην τὴν δίκην 
λαμβάνειν, 34.1-3).”
This was a standard trope in forensic oratory. 
Indeed, in one of the most famous of all foren-
sic speeches, Against Neaira, Demosthenes has 
the speaker, Apollodoros, attempt to substitute 
the laws in place of himself as the prosecuting 
litigant:  “Think not of me, Apollodoros, to be 
the speaker, nor of the citizens to be making 
the defense and advocating, but rather of the 
laws and Neaira to be disputing with each other 
over the things she did (ἡγεῖσθε δὲ μήτ’ ἐμὲ 
τὸν λέγοντα εἶναι Ἀπολλόδωρον μήτε 
τοὺς ἀπολογησομένους καὶ συνεροῦντας 
πολίτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ Νέαιραν 
ταυτηνὶ περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτῇ πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους δικάζεσθαι, 115.1-4).”  
In a similar fashion, Socrates describes the 
incessant dialogues with and questioning of his 
fellow citizens as having been commanded by divine 
authority.  The Socratic inquiry into the nature of 
wisdom and corresponding realization that wisdom 
reflects recognition of one’s own ignorance – 
hearkening back to the οὐκ οἶδα of the speech’s 
opening line – owes less to Socrates’ own volition 
18. Dionysius of Halicarnassus – 
Lysias, 19.17-18:  “κατασκευάζ
ειτὰπρόσωτατῷλόγῳπιστὰκα
ὶχρηστά ...”
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than to an order beyond his control:  
That’s why, then and now, I go around and investi-
gate and inquire whether I believe that anyone of the 
townsmen or foreigners is wise, in accordance with the 
god[‘s command].  And then, if someone doesn’t seem 
to be wise, I, rendering service to the god, demonstrate 
that they are not in fact wise.
ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ 
καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ 
ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν 
μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ 
ἔστι σοφός. (23b4-7).
While to some this argument may seem 
arrogant if not absurd, Plato’s narrative portrayal 
of Socrates’ quest as divinely ordained – akin to 
Euphiletos’ and Apollodoros’ claims that the laws 
commanded them to take their respective actions 
– ultimately resonated with Plato’s wider audience 
to such a degree that, today, Socrates’ definition 
of wisdom as recognizing one’s own ignorance 
constitutes one of the leading popular concep-
tions of a philosopher (another being arguably the 
quintessential dogmatist who actually posses-
ses – or claims to possess – knowledge).  Plato’s 
characterization of Socrates’ challenges to the 
Athenian citizens, both before and during the 
trial itself, to recognize that they, like him, are 
lacking in wisdom, is unabashedly provocative and 
ultimately serves to place the jurors, as well as the 
entire Athenian legal system, on trial.   Certainly 
no other rhetor did this, and the votes against 
Socrates provide ample evidence of why such a 
rhetorical strategy is highly unorthodox.  And 
yet, Plato’s employment of the standard rhetorical 
device of characterizing the offending action, for 
which the defendant is on trial, as a commandment 
from divine authority, links Plato’s unorthodox 
approach in defending Socrates (so as to transform 
the underlying genre) with an “orthodox” practice 
of forensic oratory – here, “orthodox,” both lite-
rally and figuratively.  His success in this regard is 
undeniable: the sort of character that Plato painted 
in his depiction of Socrates proved irresistible in the 
long run, not just to Athenian society but to western 
thought as a whole.
The vivid portrait of Socrates in his pilgrimage 
to determine whether the Delphic oracle was correct 
in deeming no one wiser than Socrates assumes a 
role of much larger importance than the wholly 
unconvincing pisteis, the “proofs,” offered by 
Socrates after his diegesis.  And this is entirely in 
keeping with the tradition of forensic oratory, where 
the pisteis often seemed of decidedly less importance 
than the character of the litigant as developed in 
the diegesis.  Indeed, the tradition can be seen as 
reaching back to the first courtroom drama, 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides, in which the arguments by 
both the prosecuting Furies and Orestes’ defense 
advocate, Apollo, are wholly unconvincing.
19
  
VI. Post Epilogos – Rhetorical Soul-
Searching
Perhaps the single most revelatory passage 
in the Apology comes when Plato draws back the 
curtain, as it were, to reveal the rhetorical options 
that had been available to his speaker.  After he has 
been convicted, Socrates discloses the approaches 
he has weighed in pleading his case:
Perhaps someone might ask, “Socrates, is it not 
possible for you to go into exile, keeping quiet and living 
a quiet life?”  This is the most difficult thing of all to 
prove to some of you.  For if I say that this would be 
to disobey the god and because of this I am not able 
to keep quiet, you will not be persuaded by me but will 
think I am being ironic.  But if I say that this happens 
to be the greatest good for humankind, to discuss every 
day virtue and the other things which you have heard 
me questioning and cross-examining both myself and 
others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living 
for a man, you will be convinced by my saying these 
things even less.
ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι: ‘σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν 
ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσῃ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν 
ζῆν;’ τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί 
τινας ὑμῶν. ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον  ἡσυχίαν 
ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ: ἐάντ᾽ 
αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν 
ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς 
19. See, e.g., (LEBECK, 1971, pp. 
135-7).Lebeck calls the proofs, 
among other things, “quibbling 
and trivial.”  While it is certainly 
reasonable to expect less in the 
way of rigor from the pisteisof a 
courtroom speech contained in a 
tragedy than in a forensic oration 
proper, my point here is that the 
tradition of less-than-rigorous 
pisteis has deep antecedents.
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τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν 
ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν 
καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος 
οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ 
μοι λέγοντι.  (37e3-38a6).
In a remarkable display of oratorical 
courage, Plato, in the person of Socrates, sho-
ws just what he had to work with in order to 
establish philosophy within the framework of fo-
rensic oratory; the limitations of the genre itself 
are revealed.  While there are instances within 
the corpus of Attic oratory of such “rhetorical 
soul-searching,”
20
 none comes close to what Plato 
does in the Apology.  Plato openly admits that 
to have stated baldly to the jurors that Socrates’ 
conduct of cross-examining his fellow citizens and 
himself on the meaning of ἀρετή amounts to “the 
greatest good for humankind (μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν 
ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο)” would have been to court 
ridicule.
21
  There was no other choice but to por-
tray Socrates’ actions by utilizing the standard 
device, in the diegesis, of a command from on high 
– such as might have been delivered in the form 
of an injunction from the laws themselves (à la 
the approach of Lysias in On the Murder of Erasto-
thenes and Demosthenes in Against Neaira) or from 
a god (such as Apollo’s command in Aeschylus’ Or-
esteia to Orestes to slay Clytemnestra).  Such were 
the constraints within which Plato had to work 
in utilizing the genre of forensic oratory as the 
vehicle to legitimize the new discourse of philo-
sophy.  The first and most lasting incarnation of 
this new discursive practice was fated to occur in a 
defense speech by Plato’s beloved master, as he 
fought not just for his own life but, even more 
profoundly, for the life of philosophy itself.  It 
is ironic that by demonstrating to what heights 
forensic oratory might aspire – the potential 
vindication of philosophy as a way of life – Pla-
to ultimately accomplished his (and Socrates’) 
mission to such a degree that the speech is 
s c a r c e l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  a  p i e -
ce of forensic oratory.  In redefining the 
boundaries of the genre, Plato transcended the 
genre.  But such a rhetorical triumph should not 
inhibit us from recognizing just how far Plato 
surpassed the oratorical masters of the day.  The 
Apology is that rare work that so transforms the 
reader’s understanding of the underlying genre as 
to almost discredit it entirely.
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truth would I be able to say 
everything . . . .(Οὐκἄρξασθαί 
μοιδοκεῖ ἄπορονεἶναι, 
ὦ ἄνδρεςδικασταί, 
τῆς κατηγορίας, ἀλλὰ 
παύσασθαι λέγοντι• τοιαῦτα 
αὐτοῖςτὸμέγεθος καὶ τοσαῦτα 
τὸ πλῆθοςεἴργασται, ὥστεμήτ’ 
ἂνψευδόμενονδεινότερα 
τῶν ὑπαρχόντων 
κατηγορῆσαι, μήτετἀληθῆ 
βουλόμενονεἰπεῖν ἅπαντα 
δύνασθαι . . . .).”  I am grateful 
to Scott Arcenas for his use of the 
term “rhetorical soul-searching” in 
describing this passage.
  
21. The thoughts presented 
here were inspired in part by R. 
Bartlett’s, 2008,Teaching Company 
lectures, Masters of Greek Thought.
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